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Pre-Implementation Review Under Section 15 of
the Shipping Act of 1916
INTRODUCTION

In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC,' the United
States Supreme Court construed section 152 of the Shipping Act of
1. 390 U.S. 261 (1968). See generally Sher, The FederalMaritime Commission and Labor
Related Matters: The Aftermath of the Volkswagenwerk Decision, 3 J. MAR. L. & Com. 647
(1972).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. IV 1974). Section 15 provides in pertinent part:
Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, shall file
immediately with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete
memorandum, of every agreement with another such carrier or other person subject
to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party
or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares;
giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or
advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling
or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise
regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried;
or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working
arrangement. The term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements.
The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel or
modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not
previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as
between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from
the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of
the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to
be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations. No such agreement shall be approved, nor shall continued
approval be permitted for any agreement (1) between carriers not members of the
same conference or conferences of carriers serving different trades that would otherwise be naturally competitive, unless in the case of agreements between carriers,
each carrier, or in the case of agreements between conferences, each conference,
retains the right of independent action, or (2) in respect to any conference agreement, which fails to provide reasonable and equal terms and conditions for admission and readmission to conference membership of other qualified carriers in the
trade, or fails to provide that any member may withdraw from membership upon
reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal.
The Commission shall disapprove any such agreement, after notice and hearing,
on a finding of inadequate policing of the obligations under it, or of failure or refusal
to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures for promptly and fairly hearing and
considering shippers' requests and complaints.
Any agreement and any modification or cancellation of any agreement not approved, or disapproved, by the Commission shall be unlawful, and agreements,
modifications, and cancellations shall be lawful only when and as long as approved
by the Commission; before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to
carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation; except that tariff rates, fares, and charges, and classifications,
rules, and regulations explanatory thereof (including changes in special rates and
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19163 as granting to the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC or
Commission) jurisdiction to require filing and approval of all restrictive maritime agreements4 that affect labor-management relations in the shipping industry. Since the Volkswagenwerk decision,
the FMC and the courts have inconsistently interpreted5 the scope
of the FMC's power under section 15 to require pre-implementation
filing and approval of collective bargaining and other labor related
agreements in the shipping industry. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in the case of Pacific Maritime Association v.
FMC to consider the most recent construction of the Commission's
section 15 jurisdiction to control anticompetitive agreements in
maritime law.
In Pacific MaritimeAssociation, the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the FMC's exercise of jurisdiction over a collective bargaincharges covered by section 813a of this title which do not involve a change in the
spread between such rates and charges and the rates and charges applicable to
noncontract shippers) agreed upon by approved conferences, and changes and
amendments thereto, if otherwise in accordance with law, shall be permitted to take
effect without prior approval upon compliance with the publication and filing requirements of section 817(b) of this title and with the provisions of any regulations
the Commission may adopt.
Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section, or permitted under section 813a of this title, shall be excepted from the provisions of
sections 1 to 11 and 15 of Title 15, and amendments and Acts supplementary
thereto.
Id.
3. Id. §§ 801-42 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974).
4. Agreements subject to § 15 include written or oral formal agreements, understandings,
conferences, and other arrangements of an ongoing nature between maritime interests that
affect competition in the shipping industry. Id. § 814; see note 2 supra. For a discussion of
agreements subject to § 15 and those which fall outside its scope, see Seatrain Lines, Inc. v.
FMC, 411 U.S. 726, 739-43 (1973); United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp.
656, 658-59 (D.N.J. 1971). The Seatrain case involved the question of whether a merger or
acquisition of assets between maritime interests was an "agreement" within the meaning of
§ 15 of the Shipping Act, and thus subject to FMC approval. Concluding that such agreements were outside the scope of § 15, the Supreme Court stated:
[lIn enacting section 15, Congress did not intend to invest the Commission with
the power to shield from antitrust liability merger or acquisition-of-assets agreements which impose no ongoing responsibilities. Rather, Congress intended to invest the Commission with jurisdiction over only those agreements, or those portions
of agreements, which created ongoing rights and responsibilities and which, therefore, necessitated continuous Commission supervision.
Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 411 U.S. 726, 729 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. FMC, 543 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
430 U.S. 905 (1977); New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. FMC, 495 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974); United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping Ass'n, 15 F.M.C.
33 (1971) (Boston I), on remand, 16 F.M.C. 7 (1972) (Boston II).
6. 543 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); see text accompanying
notes 90-96 infra.
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ing agreement between the Pacific Maritime Associaton (PMA)7
and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
(ILWU). The agreement imposed participation hiring hall procedures on non-PMA employers of dockworkers. The court held that
collective bargaining agreements are not subject to either the preimplementation filing requirements or the approval of the Federal
Maritime Commission.8
Pacific MaritimeAssociation highlights the jurisdictional conflict
between the FMC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 9
concerning maritime agreements that affect both national labor policy' 0 and the shipping industry. In practice, the FMC and the courts
have adopted an ad hoc approach, balancing labor and shipping
interests," to determine the scope of the Commission's section 15
jurisdiction. One of the principal reasons for adopting this case by
case determination has been the difficulty in reconciling the conflict
between the national labor policy promoting freedom of collective
bargaining and the national policy favoring a competitive shipping
2
industry.'
BACKGROUND

The collective bargaining agreement in issue in Pacific Maritime
Association arose out of the 1972 and 1973 labor negotiations between the Pacific Maritime Association and the ILWU. 3 The controversy concerned the employment of dockworkers registered with
PMA-ILWU hiring halls by non-association employers.' 4 The collective bargaining agreement required non-association employers, as a
condition to the use of the hiring halls, to participate in fringe
7. Maritime and shipping associations are multi-employer collective bargaining units
representing various employers of dockworkers.
8. 543 F.2d at 411-12. The court believed that "[aigreements between labor and management, while subject to antitrust and shipping legislation, cannot be fitted into the preimplementation approval procedures of section 15 without ignoring the national policy fostering industrial peace through collective bargaining." Id. at 411.
9. See cases cited at note 5 supra;see also text accompanying notes 63-96 infra.
10. See Fairley, ILWU-PMA Mechanization and ModernizationAgreement, 12 LAB. L.J.
664, 667 (1961).
11. United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping Ass'n, 16 F.M.C. 7, 12 (1972) (Boston
II); New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 16 F.M.C. 381, 390 (1973).
12. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 282 (1968) (Harlan, J.
concurring).
13. These agreements include the master collective bargaining agreement, agreements
evidencing understandings among Association members, and Supplemental Memorandum
No. 4. Of primary interest is the supplemental memorandum which imposes conditions on
non-members.
14. 543 F.2d at 397. Prior to the PMA-ILWU agreements in issue, non-member employers
negotiated separately with the ILWU and executed a separate agreement with the PMA
regarding the use of the PMA-ILWU hiring halls.
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benefit programs, pay full association dues and assessments, employ union members regularly, and be treated as association employers during work stoppages. 5 In hearings before the FMC concerning the validity of the agreements under the Shipping Act, the
section 15 jurisdictional issue was severed from the other issues to
expedite the proceedings."0 The FMC's hearing counsel argued that
the collective bargaining agreements in issue raised antitrust and
labor law considerations. Although the maritime agreements appeared to be outside labor's antitrust exemption, counsel contended
that the matter should be left to the NLRB and the courts, since
the NLRB and not the FMC is equipped with the expertise and
experience to handle the complexities of labor relations."7
The Commission rejected the hearing counsel's argument and
applied the guidelines enunciated in United Stevedoring Corp. v.
Boston Shipping Association.11 The FMC concluded that the agreements were outside the protection of labor's antitrust exemption
and therefore subject to the filing and approval requirements of
section 15. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit overruled
the FMC, holding the agreements to be outside the parameters of
section 15 filing and approval procedures. 9 The court stated:
At issue in the controversy is the [sic] applicability of the preimplementation filing and approval procedure of section 15 of the
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 398.
Id.
16 F.M.C. 7 (1972). The guidelines as set forth in Boston II are:
1. The collective bargaining which gives rise to the activity in question must be
in good faith. Other expressions used to characterize this element are "armslength" or "eyeball to eyeball."
2. The matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining, e.g. wages, hours or working
conditions. The matter must be a proper subject of union concern, i.e., it is intimately related or primarily and commonly associated with a bona fide labor purpose.
3. The result of the collective bargaining does not impose terms on entities outside
of the collective bargaining group.
4. The union is not acting at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups,
i.e., there is no conspiracy with management.
Id. at 13. The Commission further stated:
In the final analysis, the nature of the activity must be scrutinized to determine
whether it is the type of activity which attempts to affect competition under the
antitrust laws or the Shipping Act. The impact upon business which this activity
has must then be examined to determine the extent of its possible effect upon
competition, and whether any such effect is a direct and probable result of the
activity or only remote. Ultimately, the relief requested or the sanction imposed by
law must then be weighed against its effect upon the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
19. 543 F.2d at 411-12.
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Shipping Act of 1916 to a collective bargaining agreement between
the union and a multi-employer bargaining unit. 0
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

15

The Shipping Act of 1916 was the legislative response to recommendations contained in the report on steamship agreements and
affiliations filed by the Alexander Committee. 21 Congress, in adopting the Alexander Report recognized that certain anticompetitive
practices were advantageous to the shipping industry;22 at the same
time, however, some government supervision was deemed necessary
to prevent monopolistic abuses. 23 The statute was enacted to eliminate disadvantages and abuses in foreign and domestic shipping
created by secret anticompetitive agreements and conferences between shipping concerns. 2 To effectuate this purpose, section 15 of
the Shipping Act of 1916 requires a wide variety of maritime agreements 2 affecting competition in the shipping industry be filed with
the FMC for approval before implementation.
Section 15 of the Act is designed to grant the shipping industry a
limited antitrust exemption.26 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in
Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference27 held that the
20.
21.

Id. at 396.

HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS
AND AFFILIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 415-24 (1914) [hereinafter cited as

Alexander Report]. The House and Senate reports on the Shipping Act of 1916 incorporated
the recommendations of the Alexander Report. The recommendations were followed in large
part by Congress in framing the original provisions of the Act. S. REP. No. 689, 64th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7-12 (1916); H.R. REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-32 (1916).
22. Alexander Report, supra note 21, at 416. The Alexander Committee reported:
[There are] advantages . . . resulting from agreements and conferences if honestly
and fairly conducted, such as greater regularity and frequency of service, stability
and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of service, better distribution of sailings, maintenance of American and European rates to foreign markets on a parity,
and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination of secret arrangements and
underhanded methods of discrimination ...
23. Id. at 416-18; S. REP. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1916); H.R. REP. No. 659,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-32 (1916).
24. The complaints filed with the Alexander Committee included objections to the secrecy
surrounding maritime agreements and conferences, "excessive rates, discrimination between
shippers in rates and cargo space . . .arbitrariness in the settlement of just claims, failure
to give due notice to shippers when rates were to be increased, refusal to properly adjust rates
as between various classes of commodities, and the unfairness of certain methods-such as
fighting ships, deferred rebates, the threats to refuse shipping accommodations-used by
some conference lines to meet the competition of nonconference lines." Alexander Report,
supra note 21, at 417.
25. See note 4 supra.
26. Alexander Report, supra note 21, at 418-21.
27. 383 U.S. 213 (1966). The Carnation case involved ratemaking agreements between
maritime interests which had not been filed with the FMC for approval before implementation. The Court stated that "[tlhe creation of an antitrust exemption for rate-making activi-
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Shipping Act of 1916 did not completely preclude the application
of the antitrust laws to the shipping industry.28 Congress intended
the antitrust exemption be available only to anticompetitive agreements filed and approved by the FMC pursuant to section 15.
Hence, agreements implemented without filing and approval remain subject to federal antitrust laws. 29 In Carnation, the Court
found that maritime accords implemented without FMC approval,
although subject to the antitrust statutes, might also be tested
under the shipping laws.30 The validity of these agreements would
be measured against sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act.
Section 15 empowers the FMC to disapprove, cancel, or modify
agreements it finds unjustly discriminatory or unfair, detrimental
to interstate or foreign commerce, or in violation of the shipping
laws.3 The Commission may exercise its supervisory authority
whether or not the agreements have been previously approved under
section 15.32
Section 16 of the Shipping Act of 191611 makes it unlawful for any
ties which are lawful under the Shipping Act implies that unlawful rate-making activities are
not exempt." Id. at 216-17. Thus, agreements not approved by the FMC under § 15 carry no
exemption from the other provisions of the Act or the antitrust laws.
28. The United States Supreme Court in Carnation believed that the provisions of the
Shipping Act could not be construed as an implied repeal of all antitrust regulation. Id. at
217-18.
In addition, the Court has held that the FMC should consider antitrust policy in its
decisions under § 15 of the Act. FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish America Line),
390 U.S. 238 (1968); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
29. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 216-20 (1966).
30. Id. at 221-24. The Supreme Court in Carnationreversed the court of appeals' dismissal of the antitrust action involving the unapproved but implemented agreements stating:
Petitioner's failure to seek Shipping Act reparations does not affect its rights under
the antitrust laws. The rights which petitioner claims under the antitrust laws are
entirely collateral to those which petitioner might have sought under the Shipping
Act. This does not suggest that petitioner might have sought recovery under both,
but petitioner did have his choice.
Id. at 224.
31. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. IV 1974); see note 2 supra.
32. Id. See note 2 supra.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. IV 1974). Section 16 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any shipper, consignor, consignee, forwarder, broker, or
other person, or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, knowingly and willfully,
directly or indirectly, by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing,
false report of weight, or by any other unjust or unfair device or means to obtain or
attempt to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or
charges which would otherwise be applicable.
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or person subject to this
chapter, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectlyFirst. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to
subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. . ..
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shipping interest to practice discriminatory acts. The section proscribes activities which grant unjustifiable preference or advantage
or impose undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage on any
person. In addition, unfair price discounts from regular rates and
charges for transportation of property, are expressly prohibited. 3
Section 1735 of the Act makes it unlawful for shipping interests in
foreign commerce to charge or collect unjustly discriminatory or
prejudicial rates, fares, or charges. This section gives the FMC jurisdiction over the transporting and storage practices of all maritime
3
interests subject to the Act. 1
Although the Supreme Court in Carnationexpressly recognized
the applicability of the provisions of the Act, sections 15, 16 and 17
were not necessary to the Court's disposition of the case. Since the
plaintiff brought the action under the antitrust laws, the Court
considered only whether an antitrust remedy was appropriate. 7
If a remedy is pursued under the maritime laws, however, and a
collective bargaining agreement between a union and a shipping
Second. To allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than
the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carrier
by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report of weight,
or by any other unjust or unfair device or means.
Third. To induce, persuade, or otherwise influence any maritime insurance company or underwriter, or agent thereof, not to give a competing carrier by water as
favorable a rate of insurance on vessel or cargo, having due regard to the class of
vessel or cargo, as is granted to such carrier or other person subject to this chapter.
Whoever violates any provision of this section other than paragraphs First and
Third hereof shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each
violation.
Whoever violates paragraphs First and Third hereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 for each offense.
Id.
34. Id.
35. 46 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. IV 1974). Section 17 provides:
No common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall demand, charge, or collect
any rate, fare or charge which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports,
or unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with their
foreign competitors. Whenever the Federal Maritime Commission finds that any
such rate, fare, or charge is demanded, charged or collected it may alter the same
to the extent necessary to correct such unjust discrimination or prejudice and make
an order that the carrier shall discontinue demanding, charging, or collecting any
such unjustly discriminatory or prejudicial rate, fare or charge.
Every such carrier and every other person subject to this chapter shall establish,
observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or
connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever
the Commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable
it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation
or practice.
Id.
36. Id.
37. See note 30 supra.
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employer is found violative of sections 16 and 17, the shipping interests involved are subject to the sanctions provided by the terms of
the Act. 31 Under section 15 the FMC has the power to approve,
cancel, or modify such an agreement where it is found "to be in
violation of this chapter. . . ."I' Thus, if an implemented but unapproved collective bargaining agreement is determined to be in violation of sections 16 and 17 of the Act, the Commission may cancel
or modify the agreement.
THE COMMISSION'S POWER UNDER SECTION

35

In 1966 Congress amended the Shipping Act of 1916 to include
section 35.40 The new provision empowers the FMC to exempt any
class of shipping agreements from the requirements of the Shipping
Act of 191641 or the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933.42 Of course,
the FMC's exemptive powers are not unlimited. The Commission
may order a section 35 exemption only after notice and opportunity
for a full hearing have been afforded interested parties. No exemption will be granted, however, where it impairs substantially the free
43
flow of commerce.
Section 35 specifically provides that agreements may be exempt
from FMC regulation only where the Commission finds that "such
exemption will not substantially impair effective regulation by the
Federal Maritime Commission, be unjustly discriminatory, or be
detrimental to commerce."" Further, the Commission is authorized
to attach conditions to effectuate the national policy favoring a free
and unrestricted economy. The FMC may also, after affording all
38. Section 16 of the Shipping Act provides civil and criminal penalties for violations of
its provisions. Section 17 empowers the FMC to correct any violation of its provisions. See
notes 33 and 35 supra.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 814. See also note 2 supra.
40. Id. § 833a (Supp. IV 1974). Section 35 provides:
The Federal Maritime Commission, upon application or on its own motion, may
by order or rule exempt for the future any class of agreements between persons
subject to this chapter or any specified activity of such persons from any requirement of this chapter, or Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, where it finds that such
exemption will not substantially impair effective regulation by the Federal Maritime Commission, be unjustly discriminatory, or be detrimental to commerce.
The Commission may attach conditions to any such exemptions and may, by
order revoke any such exemption.
No order or rule of exemption or revocation of exemption shall be issued unless
opportunity for hearing has been afforded interested persons.
41. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974).
42. Id. §§ 843-48 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974).
43. Id. § 833a; see note 40 supra; S. REP. No. 1459, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1966).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 833a (Supp. IV 1974).
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interested parties a full hearing, revoke any exemption previously
granted."
The purpose of section 3511 is "to provide the Federal Maritime
Commission with authority to exempt certain operations of water
carriers or other persons or activities from provisions of the Shipping
Act, 1916, where circumstances would warrant such action."I The
Senate Commerce Committee's report on section 35 notes that strict
compliance with the Act involves unnecessary expense to the government and to persons subject to the Act where the maritime activity has an inconsequential effect on commerce.48 The Commission's
authority under section 35 to grant exemptions from the provisions
or requirements of the Act, relieves the FMC and affected parties
from undue regulation and an unnecessarily time-consuming burden. Further, the creation of classes of exempt agreements prevents
piecemeal regulation and supervision by the Commission. 9
It is arguable that anticompetitive agreements between shipping
associations and dockworkers' unions can have more than an inconsequential effect on commerce. However, this potential is slight in
comparison to the demonstrated effects of labor-management conflicts. The effect on commerce of strikes and work stoppages arising
out of labor disputes is pervasive. Longshoremen's strikes and work
stoppages have frequently shut down the nation's ports and coast
lines. The significant impact of these disruptions on national and
international commerce cannot be ignored."
The FMC, by exempting collective bargaining agreements from
the pre-implementation filing and approval procedure of section 15,
does not limit or impair its power to regulate the agreements under
the Shipping Act. Furthermore, these accords remain subject to the
antitrust statutes and the labor laws." As a result, the collective
bargaining process is permitted to continue undisturbed by Commission intervention. According to the District of Columbia Circuit
in Pacific Maritime Association v. FMC,12 the FMC's exemptive
power under section 35 presents the most sensible resolution of the
3
conflict.1
45. Id.
46. The purposes of § 35 of the Shipping Act are set forth in the Senate Committee report.
S. REP. No. 1459, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
47. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 295 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
51. See text accompanying notes 21-39 supra.
52. 543 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
53. Id. at 409.
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THE IMPACT OF LABOR'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION ON MARITIME
INTERESTS

Labor's Antitrust Exemption
The jurisdictional question confronting the United States Supreme Court in PacificMaritimeAssociation arises as a result of two
competing national policies. The antitrust laws promote competition, while labor legislation seeks to protect working class interests
by guaranteeing the right to bargain collectively. 54 By enacting the
Wagner Act in 1935, 55 Congress adopted collective bargaining as a
national policy "for the prevention and settlement of labor disputes. '56 This national labor policy favors unfettered collective bargaining.57 The resolution of labor-management differences without
strikes and work stoppages effectively serves the public interest.
Congress further protected labor's right to bargain collectively by
enacting a federal antitrust exemption for labor, 58 and by providing
for NLRB55 supervision of the collective bargaining process.
In addition, labor is also protected by a judicially developed exemption from the antitrust laws. 0 This exemption arises from the
courts' acknowledgement that federal labor policy requires tolerance of labor's anticompetitive efforts concerning wages and working conditions. However, this tolerance does not allow unions to
54. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945); see Cox, Rights Under
a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 601, 616-27 (1965). For an extensive discussion of the
conflict between national labor policy and the national policy in favor of competition and free
commerce, see Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.
CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Meltzer].
55. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV
1974).
56. Feinsinger, The NationalLabor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining,57 MICH.L.
REv. 807, 808-11 (1959). Professor Feinsinger, quoting from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45, noted: "The act was based on the theory '...that free opportunity for
negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace
and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act itself does not attempt
to compel.' " Feinsinger, supra at 808.
57. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See
Meltzer, supra note 54.
58. The sources of labor's statutory exemption from the federal antitrust laws are § 6 and
§ 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), and §§ 4, 5 and 13 of
the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (1970).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974).
60. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1944); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); see
Meltzer, supra note 54, for a discussion of the above cases and their relationship to the
conflicting policies found in labor and commerce; Note, Congress and the Courts at Cross
Purposes: Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 782 (1976).
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freely impose direct restraints on competition among employers of
union members."
Labor's antitrust exemption is intended to promote collective bargaining between labor and management. 2 This national policy in
favor of collective bargaining inevitably collides with the national
policy favoring the free flow of commerce. While collective bargaining should be fostered, agreements between shipping interests and
dockworkers' unions should not be permitted to impinge on the
FMC's regulation and supervision of competition in the maritime
industry.
The Volkswagenwerk Precedent
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC,13 the Federal Maritime Commission had
not attempted to assert section 15 jurisdiction over agreements that
involved labor matters and disputes. In Volkswagenwerk, the Supreme Court held that the FMC had jurisdiction over an assessment
agreement among members of a multi-employer association created
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the association and the dockworkers' union. As a result of the Supreme Court's
construction of section 15,64 it has been held that collective bargaining provisions affecting maritime competition must be filed with
and approved by the FMC before implementation. 5
Recurring labor difficulties in the West Coast shipping industry
led to the bargaining agreement in Volkswagenwerk.6 In return for
the ILWU's promise to introduce labor saving devices and eliminate
certain restrictive work practices, the Pacific Maritime Association
agreed to create a Mechanization and Modernization Fund. The
purpose of the fund was to mitigate the impact of technological
unemployment on longshoremen. 7 The association reserved the
right to determine the method by which the fund would be raised.
Association members subsequently adopted an assessment formula.
61. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
62. See Meltzer, supra note 54.
63. 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
64. The Court determined the FMC had construed its own jurisdiction too narrowly in
view of the expansive language of the statute. Id. at 273-75.
65. Id. See New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. FMC, 495 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 964 (1974). But see Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. FMC, 543 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
66. 390 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1968).
67. Id. at 264. See Fairley, ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreements,
12 LAs. L.J. 664 (1961); Fleming, New Challengesfor Collective Bargaining,1964 Wis. L. REv.
426; see generally Note, Automation and CollectiveBargaining,84 HAv. L. REV. 1822 (1971).
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The Court held that the assessment agreement between Pacific
Maritime Association members was subject to the filing and approval requirements of section 15. The Court emphasized that it was
the funding agreement between association members and not the
collective bargaining agreement that was within the FMC's jurisdiction."

Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the fund assessment
agreement was inseparable from the collective bargaining agreement. According to Justice Douglas, the practical effect of the
Court's holding would be to cause a disruption of collective bargaining negotiations. 9 Further, to require filing and Commission approval of labor agreements before implementation would paralyze
labor-management negotiations.7
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, recognized and predicted that the overlap between the national policies of collective
bargaining and competitive commerce would present problems.'
The principles underlying section 15 are broad" and have the potential to impinge upon other areas of national policy. This policy
conflict demands that a delicate balance be maintained between the
competing labor and maritime interests. The FMC's jurisdictional
exercise must be tempered by an understanding that the national
labor policy may, at times, dominate shipping interests when the
73
two are in conflict.
68.

390 U.S. at 278:
It is to be emphasized that the only agreement involved in this case is the one
among members of the Association allocating the impact of the Mech Fund levy.
We are not concerned here with the agreement creating the Association or with the

collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the ILWU. No claim
has been made in this case that either of those agreements was subject to the filing
requirements of § 15. Those agreements, reflecting the national labor policy of free
collective bargaining by representatives of the parties' choice, fall in an area of
concern to the National Labor Relations Board, and nothing we have said in this
opinion is to be understood as questioning their continuing validity. But in negotiating with the ILWU, the Association insisted that its members were to have the
exclusive right to determine how the Mech Fund was to be assessed, and a clause
to that effect was included in the collective bargaining agreement. That assessment
arrangement, affecting only relationships among Association members and their
customers, is all that is before us in this case.
69. Id. at 310 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also believed § 15 was misconstrued by the Court. "[Tio require the funding part of maritime collective bargaining agreements to receive prior approval from the Maritime Commission is to use a sledge hammer to
fix a watch. I cannot read § 15 so as to attribute to Congress such a heavy-handed management of sensitive labor problems." Id. at 296.
70. Id. at 315-16.
71. Id. at 282-95 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. See note 21 supra; see also text accompanying notes 21-39 supra.
73. Justice Harlan noted:
The real difficulty in this case is not to distinguish between agreements that must
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Post Volkswagenwerk Developments
The jurisdictional dispute between labor interests and the FMC
arose again in 1971. In United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping
Association (Boston I) the Commission asserted section 15 jurisdiction over hiring and work assignment arrangements contained in
a collective bargaining agreement between the Boston Shipping
Association (BSA) and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). Following the Supreme Court's Volkswagenwerk decision, the FMC interpreted section 15 broadly, and stated that if an
agreement is arguably subject to that section and is embodied in a
collective bargaining agreement, it must be filed with the Commission for approval.75 The Commission premised its exercise of jurisdiction on Supreme Court dicta in Volkswagenwerk and United
Mine Workers v. Pennington.8 The BSA and the ILA instituted an
appeal from this determination. After a reconsideration of the dominance of labor issues involved, the FMC petitioned for a remand of
the case.
On remand from the First Circuit," the FMC held (BostonII) that
the BSA-ILA agreements were entitled to labor's antitrust exemption and thus were outside the scope of the FMC's review and approval authority under section 15.11 The agreement in the Boston
Shipping controversy was not an assessment or funding agreement
as in Volkswagenwerk. An assessment or funding arrangement, although of concern to labor interests, has a direct and substantial
impact on the financial and competitive integrity of the shipping
be filed and agreements whose impact on competition will be evaluated after implementation, but to define the Commission's jurisdiction in such a way that (whether
challenges arise before or after implementation) the Commission will not improperly be brought into labor matters where it does not belong.
390 U.S. at 286. Although the problem was not before the Court at that time, Justice Harlan
suggested that collective bargaining agreements between maritime employers and unions
must have some exemption from the filing requirements of § 15. He stated that
Since maritime employers are permitted to bargain as a group, and since they are
required to bargain about certain subjects, the resulting agreements must have
some exemption from the filing requirements of § 15 and from successful challenge
under the antitrust laws or under the substantive principles in § § 16 and 17 of the
Shipping Act. The exact extent of the "labor exemption" or "labor immunity" from
statutes regulating competition has troubled this Court before; however, since no
collective bargaining agreement is now before us, it would be inappropriate to
suggest the affirmative extent of the immunity.
Id. at 287.
74. 15 F.M.C. 33 (1971) (Boston I).
75. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
76. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
77. Boston Shipping Ass'n v. FMC, No. 72-1004 (1st Cir. May 31, 1972) (unpublished
opinion), on remand, 16 F.M.C. 7 (1972) (Boston II).
78. 16 F.M.C. at 14-15.
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industry. The work assignment procedure included in the BSA-ILA
collective bargaining agreement, however, related solely to the
method of hiring longshoremen. The agreement contained no provision imposing either financial or competitive burdens on carriers or
shippers.79 "Because of the strong labor considerations involved and
minimal and remote effects upon competition in the industry .... "0 the FMC declined to assert section 15 jurisdiction on
remand.
The anticompetitive impact of union-employer accords on the
maritime industry must be balanced against the adverse effect on
collective bargaining posed by the pre-implementation review requirements. The Commission, although holding in Boston II that
the agreements were outside its section 15 jurisdiction, stated it
could not sanction a "blanket labor exemption from the Shipping
2
Act.'' Noting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Volkswagenwerk,8
the FMC pointed out that a single maritime agreement could raise
issues that come within the jurisdiction of both the NLRB and the
FMC.
In New York Shipping Association, Inc. v. FMC,83 the Second
Circuit upheld the FMC's jurisdiction over an assessment and compensation arrangement contained in a collective bargaining agreement. In New York Shipping Association, as in Volkswagenwerk,
the employers' association and the union created a fund to compensate dockworkers displaced from employment by mechanization. In
this case, however, the union demanded participation in the fund's
collection processes. 4 The formula for ascertaining each employer's
contribution to the fund and the methods of collection were incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. This was the first
time a payment formula was made part of the agreement between
management and dockworkers.
The New York Shipping Association and the ILA, before implementation, petitioned the Commission for a ruling that the assessment agreement was not subject to the section 15 filing and approval procedures. The Association and the ILA argued that the
agreement was not one between water carriers or other persons sub79. Id. at 14.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
82. 390 U.S. 261, 282 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan saw "no reason for assuming, in advance, that a maritime agreement must always fall neatly into either the Labor
Board or Maritime Commission domain; a single contract might well raise issues of concern
to both." Id. at 286.
83. 495 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974).
84. Id. at 1216.
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ject to the Act, 5 and thus, it was not within the purview of section
15.86 Further, the parties argued that because the assessment formula was part of a collective bargaining agreement, it was exempt
from the Shipping Act. The FMC, embracing the construction given
section 15 in Volkswagenwerk, held the assessment formula within
its jurisdiction. 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Commission's determination. The agreement, at least in part, imposed obligations on
88
water carriers and other persons subject to the Act.
Volkswagenwerk established that agreements allocating assessments for benefits which result from negotiations with dockworkers'
unions are subject to section 15. The fact that the assessment agreement in Volkswagenwerk was one between association members
only, while the New York Shipping Association assessment arrangement included the union as a party, was irrelevant in the Second
Circuit's view. Although the union had a genuine interest in supervising the fund, the FMC was not relieved of its supervisory responsibility where the arrangement had a direct and substantial impact
on competition in the maritime industry. 9
The Pacific Maritime Association Response
The Federal Maritime Commission faced the most serious challenge to its section 15 jurisdiction in the recent District of Columbia
Circuit case, Pacific Maritime Association v. FMC. 0 Maritime employers operating facilities on the Pacific coast, who were not PMA
members, petitioned the Commission for a ruling that an agreement
between the Association and the union affecting non-members, was
subject to the filing and approval procedures under section 15. Similar to the New York Shipping Association case, the PMA and the
longshoremen imposed anticompetitive arrangements on employers
who did not participate in the collective bargaining agreement.
85. The definitions of persons and entities subject to the Shipping Act of 1916 are set forth
in §1 of the Act, 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970). The Act is applicable to common carriers by water
engaged in foreign and interstate commerce. Other persons subject to the Act are "any person
not included in the term 'common carrier by water,' carrying on the business of forwarding
or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a
common carrier by water." Id.
86. Section 15 states that agreements subject to its requirements are those between
"[elvery common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter ..
" and any
other "such carrier or other person subject to this chapter." 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. IV 1974).
See note 85 supra.
87. New York Shipping Ass'n, 16 F.M.C. 381 (1973).
88. 495 F.2d at 1220.
89. Id. at 1220-21.
90. 543 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
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Relying on Volkswagenwerk and New York Shipping Association,
the FMC exercised jurisdiction and demanded pre-implementation
filing and approval of the collective bargaining accords.'
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the FMC.
The court recognized, but rejected the Second Circuit's holding in
New York Shipping Association, and construed narrowly the
Volkswagenwerk decision. 2 According to the Pacific Maritime
Association court the protection of labor's right to bargain collectively was paramount. Because of the overriding importance of labor
policy, collective bargaining agreements should be exempt from the
pre-implementation filing procedures. The court held that, although arrangements between labor and management in the maritime industry may be subject to antitrust and shipping regulations,
the FMC cannot demand pre-implementation filing where compliance with section 15 unduly impedes the labor union's exercise of
its federal guarantees. The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned
that to hold otherwise would frustrate the national policy favoring
industrial peace through collective bargaining."
Pacific Maritime Association expressly contradicts the Second
Circuit holding in New York Shipping Association and interprets
narrowly the Supreme Court's Volkswagenwerk decision. It also
highlights the growing tension between longshoremen and shipping
interests concerning the efficacy of the collective bargaining process
in maritime law. 4 Because of the absence of articulated standards
for determining the proper circumstances for FMC jurisdiction, the
lower courts and the Commission have attempted to follow the unsteady case law under section 15.11 More importantly, the Pacific
Maritime Association decision demonstrates that the inconsistent
interpretation of the FMC's jurisdiction is a result of differing approaches to the overlap between the national labor policy and the
policy of commercial competition in the shipping industry. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pacific Maritime
91. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, Doc. No 72-48 (FMC Jan. 30, 1975).
92. 543 F.2d at 407-09.
93. Id. at 406-11. Congress endorsed collective bargaining as a national policy by the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV 1974). The "Findings and Policies" reflected in the provisions of the NLRA are
set out in § 1 of the Act. Id. § 151. In that section, Congress declared the policy of the United
States to be the elimination of "certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce"
by encouraging collective bargaining and protecting labor's federal guarantees. See, e.g., §§
7, 8, 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 159 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV 1974).
94. See Goldberg, Effects of the Structure of Collective Bargainingon Selected Industries:
The Maritime Industry, 21 LAB. L.J. 505 (1970).
95. See cases cited note 5 supra; see also text accompanying notes 63-93 supra.
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Association," presumably to resolve the Commission's jurisdictional
tangle and to provide guidance to the NLRB and the FMC for the
proper allocation of functions between the agencies under the labor
laws and the Shipping Act of 1916.
CONCLUSION

The District of Columbia Circuit in Pacific MaritimeAssociation
proposes one solution to this jurisdictional battle: exempt all collective bargaining agreements from the pre-implementation filing and
approval requirements of section 15. This balance between the competing policies appears to be the most reasonable solution to the
problem.
Under section 35 of the Act, the FMC is empowered to exempt
collective bargaining agreements as a class from pre-implementation requirements, leaving them subject to regulation and supervision under the antitrust statutes, federal labor law, and the
Shipping Act. Eliminating the pre-implementation review procedures for collective bargaining accords will not unreasonably impede the FMC's authority to promote competition in the shipping
industry. Further, the proscription of discriminatory and anticompetitive practices in the maritime industry under sections 16 and 17
of the Act remains unaffected. If an activity is unlawful under these
provisions, the Commission retains jurisdiction under section 15 to
disapprove, cancel, or modify the agreement, regardless of labor's
possible exemption from the filing requirements.
If the Supreme Court adopts the District of Columbia Circuit's
resolution to the jurisdictional problem, collective bargaining will
proceed unimpaired, a result contemplated in the national labor
acts. At the same time, a competitive and responsive shipping industry can be insured by the FMC's vigorous enforcement of sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act. Although pre-implementation
filing of potentially anticompetitive agreements is preferable, the
satisfactory accommodation of two conflicting national policies
demands considerable adjustment in the statutory scheme. 7
96. 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
97. Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. FMC, 543 F.2d 395, 406-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
430 U.S. 905 (1977). See Dooley, Antitrust Legislation and Labor Unions, 11 LkB. L.J. 911
(1960); Meltzer, supra note 4, at 659. Professor Meltzer begins his discussion of the interplay
of labor and antitrust policies-policies that are reflected in § 15 of the Shipping Act of
1916-by observing:
The national policy in favor of competition, reflected in the antitrust laws, is
designed to promote economic efficiency, consumer welfare, and a system of diffused power. The national labor policy fosters, or at least tolerates, large-scale labor
organization despite its capacity to interfere with those economic and noneconomic
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Arguably, the approach of the District of Columbia Circuit strikes
the balance in favor of labor policy. But, by allocating and demarcating the respective agency functions-control over the multifaceted collective bargaining process to the NLRB and jurisdiction to
proscribe anticompetitive and discriminatory practices affecting the
shipping industry to the FMC-two national policies will best-be
served.
SUSAN STEINHOLTZ SENNETT

objectives of the antitrust laws. Accommodation of these conflicting policies, or the
subordination of one policy to the other, has, for some time, been a troublesome
and unruly issue.

